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Book Reviews
MAAYLAD CoRPoRATI oN LAW AND PRAcTiCE, Revised
Edition. By Herbert M. Brune, Jr. Washington, D. C.
Washington Law Book Company, 1953. Pp. XVIII, 848.
$20.00.

By Laws 1908, Chapter 240, commonly known as the
Bar Association Bill of 1908, a complete revision and recodification was effected in the Maryland laws relating to corporations generally. Shortly thereafter Joseph C. France,
the reporter of the commission responsible for the drafting
of this legislation, wrote "Principles of Maryland Corporation Law".
In 1933, the first edition of the present work by Mr.
Brune was published. The framework of the statutory law
was still that of the Act of 1908, but sections of Article 23
had been amended at almost every session of the General
Assembly and the statutory picture in 1933 was far different
from that in 1908. With substantial changes in the law and
with the constantly increasing volume of corporate practice the first edition of this work was welcomed by the bar.
Further, the work did, as stated in the Preface, represent
"the first attempt to collect all the Maryland statutes and
case law applicable to corporations generally". This comment could not have been made of Mr. France's work, excellent as it was. Nor could the comment have been made
with respect to the annotated pamphlets of the Maryland
Corporation Law issued periodically by the State Tax Commission. This factor made the 1933 publication doubly
welcome.
Twenty years have now passed, the first edition of the
work is out of print, the statutory law has been completely
revised and recodified by Laws 1951, Chapter 135, and the
courts have decided a large number of cases which affect
corporation law and practice. Almost any combination of
these factors would justify a new edition of the work. The
present Revised Edition published in May, 1953, answers a
basic need. The work will be invaluable both to practitioners and to students of the Maryland law. The scope of
natural interest in the book, outside the State as well as
for Maryland practitioners, is indicated from the extensive
use of the Maryland law referred to in the Preface. Widespread interest is most certainly to be expected in a law
which will control operations of over 17,000 corporations,
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and the purpose of the author has been to fulfill the need
for a complete reference work on this law.
The book contains as Part 1 a treatise on the Maryland
corporation law, as Part 2 certain office forms, as Part 3
certain official forms of the State Tax Commission, and as
Part 4 the text of the statute law with a reproduction of
the Explanatory Notes to the Report of the Revision Commission, which prepared the Act of 1951 and submitted the
proposed bill to the Legislative Council. Tables and an
index follow.
The "office forms" of Part 2 are the forms required in
practice for initial incorporation and organization, that is,
articles of incorporation, by-laws and organization minutes.
The inclusion of other forms in more or less common use
would have been a welcome addition to the book; the author
cannot, however, be criticized where limits of space do not
permit extensions in the scope of a work.
The "official forms" contained in Part 3 are, in fact,
skeleton forms provided by the State Tax Commission as
guides to compliance with statutory requirements, plus the
1952 Form of Personal Property Returns and Annual Franchise Tax Report. In addition to articles of incorporation,
the forms for domestic corporations include articles of
amendment, stock issuance statement, articles of reduction,
articles of dissolution, articles of revival, and notifications
with reference to resident agent and principal office designation and changes. Foreign corporation forms are also
included.
The text of the statutory law contained in Part 4 calls
for no comment. In the opinion of the reviewer, Mr. Brune's
decision to include in Part 4 the Explanatory Notes to the
Commission's Report on the 1951 Act, and also to include
in the tables the cross-references between the 1951 Act and
the old law, was one for which the Bar should be grateful.
The Reports of the Corporation Law Commission, containing these Explanatory Notes and tables will in time become
more and more difficult to obtain. Inclusion of them in Mr.
Brune's book will make them permanently available.
Of most general interest is the treatise on the Maryland
corporation law comprising Part 1 of the volume. Notable
in the Revised Edition is a new chapter on the general
subject of equity jurisdiction and procedure. Otherwise,
the form follows that of the first edition, which is now
familiar to practitioners interested in the Maryland law.
The discussion of the corporation law has been brought
up to date, and a large number of annotations have been
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added for cases decided since date of publication of the
earlier edition. The author has devoted both thought and
effort to his analysis of the statutory law and of the decisions
under that law. Attempts have been made to indicate that
certain cases decided under earlier statutes may now be of
doubtful value as precedents. No justifiable criticism can
be made of the work for not containing a caveat to every
annotation on this score; both the practitioner and the
student must be consciously aware at all times that in the
field of corporation law statutes play a major part and that
these statutes are from time to time amended.
The work is thorough and has been done competently.
It is a "must" addition for the library of all lawyers who
engage in any substantial volume of practice in the Maryland corporation law.
McKENNY W. EGERTON*

PSYcHIATRY AND THE LAw. By Manfred S. Guttmacher
and Henry Weihofen. New York. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952. Pp. viii, 476. $7.50.
To a lawyer, perhaps the most significant part of this
book is found in the three chapters entitled "Mental Disorder and the Criminal". The material in the preceding
eight chapters which deal with such subjects as sex
offenders, psychopaths, psychoneurosis and personality neurosis is but a prologue to the theme there contained, and is
essentially an orientation course on the principles of psychiatry, which is of interest to laymen equally with lawyers.
The purpose therefore of this review is to emphasize
the thinking of the authors on the pointed and timely questions which they raise concerning the criminal law and the
insane.
In Spencer v. State,1 it was said:

"... according to the law, as we find it settled by
the great preponderance of judicial authority, if the
party accused be competent to form and execute a
criminal design; or, in other words, if at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, he had capacity and
reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between
right and wrong, and understand the nature and con* Of the Baltimore City Bar.
'69 Md. 28, 37, 13 A. 809 (1888).
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sequences of his act, as applied to himself, he is a responsible agent, and amenable to the criminal law of
the land for the consequences of his act."
This is the general Maryland law of insanity, and is the
Maryland interpretation of the M'Naghten Case,2 decided
in England in 1843. The authors pointed out that this test
actually comprises two tests, viz., (1) knowledge of the
nature and quality of the act and (2) knowledge of its
wrongfulness, but that the emphasis of the courts has been
upon the wrongfulness of the act with a resulting failure to
consider the question of whether the defendant understands
its nature and quality. This is a just criticism of the manner in which the courts have applied the M'Naghten rule.
Knowledge of the nature and quality of the act really means
the understanding that the defendant had of the nature and
quality of the act. There are, however, many different degrees of understanding and courts are, not unnaturally,
reluctant to deal with these, for proof of understanding will
usually require testimony concerning motive. Motive will
not legally excuse a crime and therefore evidence bearing
on motive is generally rejected as being irrelevant. Yet the
same evidence also bears on the understanding that the defendant had of the nature and quality of the act.
The authors contend that only through study of these
conscious and unconscious motives can understanding be
had of the knowledge and personalities of the individual
and what it is that makes him a menace to society, and that
it is time for a re-examination of the criminal law dogma
that motive is irrelevant. They suggest therefore that the
substantive criminal law be changed so as to make motive
a part of criminal intent. Such an expansion of the idea of
criminal intent may perhaps be justified in those criminal
cases where the defense of insanity is interposed in order to
determine the degree of understanding that the defendant
had of the nature and quality of his act. No solution, however, is offered of the problem as to how much understanding the defendant must have to be responsible for his act
or how little understanding he must have to be considered
irresponsible.
The authors state that a poll of over three hundred psychiatrists in an evaluation of the rule of the M'Naghten
Case, resulted in the rule being considered satisfactory by
12%, unsatisfactory by 80%, fairly satisfactory by 5% and
unsatisfactory but yet the best rule possible of formulation
210 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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by 2 %.8 These results, however, are hardly novel; it is
probable that if a similar poll were taken among lawyers
the result would be about the same.
The authors object to the M'Naghten rule because it is
not broad enough to include irresistible impulse as a defense. Courts generally refused to recognize irresistible impulse as a defense because of the difficulty of both definition
and proof. To this objection the authors reply: "Whether
a truly irresistible impulse can exist is a question for psychiatrists rather than for judges to decide, and dogmatic
judicial denials that such a condition is possible have rather
gone out of fashion".' The authors distinguish between
those impulses which are wholly irresistible, those which
are partially irresistible, those which are irresistible because the impulse was generated from intrinsic motivations,
and those which are generated from exterior motivations.
Though these distinctions may, as the authors state, be clear
enough conceptually, yet to the reviewer they seem fraught
with endless and obvious difficulties if made the basis for
any practical application.
The treatment of insane delusion under the M'Naghten
rule is regarded as little short of ridiculous. The rule is:
"'If a person under an insane delusion as to an
existing facts commits an offense in consequence thereof,.. .'"and assuming ".... that he labors under such
partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, . . .he must be considered in the same situation
as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which
the delusion exists were real."5
Fundamentally, the purpose of the M'Naghten rule is,
according to the authors an:
"... attempt to isolate those offenders who, because
of their mental disorder, are nondeterrable - individuals who, because of the severity of their mental
disturbance, are incapable of being intimidated by
threats of punishment into abiding by the accepted behavioral (sic) standards of the community." 6
As a substitute the authors recommend the following:
"... a defendant should be found irresponsible when,
at the time of the act, he was suffering from a mental
GU IrMACHEi

and WEIHOFEN, 408.

'Ibid, 409.
Supra, n. 2, 211, 723.
GUrrMACHER and WEiHoFEN, 420.
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illness generally recognized by the medical profession,
and by reason of which (1) the act was committed or
(2) the defendant did not have theparticular state of
mind that must accompany such act, in order to constitute the crime charged. Section (2) would' 7have its
application in regard to degrees of homicide.
Under such a rule, it is urged, criminal court psychiatry
would attract rather than repel the more competent members of the psychiatric profession and would make for
better administration of criminal justice.'
The authors recommend that the judge be shorn of his
sentencing power, which is to be vested in a board composed
of doctors, social workers, lawyers and psychiatrists. This
suggestion is justified on the ground that, as the judge now
has the advantage of a presentence investigation report, it
would be not much of a further step to permit the persons
who make the pre-sentencing reports to do the actual sentencing. This idea has an undoubted appeal, but the administration of criminal justice is a heavy responsibility and
one resting primarily upon the courts. To the reviewer, it
would seem one which the courts may well share with, but
should not surrender to, the members of the psychiatric
profession.
BARNARD

T.

WELSH*

Op. cit., ibid, 421.
8Loc. cit., ibid. Of particular local interest in this connection is the Maryland Defective Delinquent statute, Md. Laws 1951, Ch. 476, Md. Code (1951),
Art. 31B, which will be far reaching in the Maryland criminal law in regard
to insanity. Section 5 of that Article provides:
"... a defective delinquent shall be defined as an individual who,
by the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-social or criminal
behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is
found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance,
or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to
require confinement and treatment under an indeterminate sentence,
subject to being released only if the intellectual deficiency and/or the
emotional unbalance is so relieved as to make it reasonably safe for
society to terminate the confinement and treatment."
This provision goes further than the test recommended by the authors.
* Of the Montgomery Co. (Md.) Bar.

